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The Soda Ban or the Portion Cap Rule? Litigation Over the
Size of Sugary Drink Containers as an Exercise in Framing
By Rodger Citron and Paige Bartholomew
Among the most
controversial actions taken
by a municipality in recent
years was New York City’s
(the City) efforts to restrict
restaurants, movie theaters,
and other food-service
establishments from serving sugary drinks in sizes
larger than sixteen ounces.
The City adopted the rule as
part of its efforts to address
rising rates of obesity. The
Rodger Citron
measure received extensive
news coverage, drew dueling newspaper editorials,
and thus far has been blocked by litigation.1
The rule in question has been referred to as the
“Soda Ban.”2 In fact, it does not ban soda. It only regulates the size of the container in which soda or other
sugary drinks may be served. The “Portion Cap Rule,”
as it has been labeled by the City, was adopted by the
New York City Board of Health (Board of Health) in
September 2012 and was scheduled to go into effect in
March 2013.
Before that occurred, however, the rule was challenged in court. In 2013, the New York County Supreme Court held that the rule was not valid, and this
decision was affirmed by the First Department of the
Appellate Division.3 As detailed below, both courts
essentially held that the Board of Health did not have
the authority to adopt the rule and therefore violated
separation of powers doctrine in doing so.
As this article went to press, the City was pursuing an appeal of the First Department’s decision in the
Court of Appeals.4 This article discusses the litigation
over the City’s efforts to restrict the size of sugary
drink containers. It provides a history of the rule, from
its promulgation by the Board of Health to the Appellate Division’s decision invalidating the rule.
The article also comments on the dispute between
the parties over how to frame the rule. Opponents of
the rule, including the parties who filed suit to block
the rule, characterize the measure as an unwarranted
and unprecedented incursion of consumer choice and
personal freedom. They decry the “Soda Ban.” On the
other hand, proponents of the “Portion Cap Rule,”
including the City, view the rule as a modest measure
intended to address obesity, a significant—even alarming—public health issue. (For the rest of this article, we
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will refer to the rule in question as the “soda container
rule.”)
As will be discussed, the
disagreement over how to
frame this dispute illustrates
the nature of the judgment
the courts have made thus
far. In determining whether
the Board of Health has the
authority to promulgate
the soda container rule,
Paige Bartholomew
the courts have applied the
four-factor test set out by
the Court of Appeals in Boreali v. Axelrod in order to
draw the “difficult-to-demarcate line” between permissible agency rulemaking and impermissible legislating.5 In making this determination, the courts engage
in something akin to a gestalt judgment—not only is
the application of the Boreali factors discretionary, but
some factors require nothing more than an exercise
of classification or judgment. Thus far, the petitioners
have been more successful than the City in persuading
the courts that their view of the soda container rule—
and of the governing separation of powers principles—
is correct.

Promulgation of the Rule
The soda container rule was developed by two
City agencies: the Board of Health and the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(DOHMH). To understand the authority of the Board
of Health, it is necessary to first understand the authority of DOHMH. As the First Department summarized:
“DOHMH is an administrative agency that is charged
with regulating and supervising all matters affecting
health in the city, including conditions hazardous to
life and health, by regulating the food and drug supply
of the City, and enforcing provisions of the New York
City Health Code.”6
The Board of Health “is empowered to amend
the Health Code with respect to all matters to which
the power and authority of DOHMH extend.”7 This
includes Article 81 of the Health Code, which sets out
the rules regulating City food service establishments
(FSEs).8
On May 30, 2012, Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced the soda container rule, a proposed amendment to Article 81 that would require FSEs to cap at
sixteen ounces the size of cups and containers used
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to serve sugary beverages. The stated purpose of the
rule was to address rising obesity rates in the City.
In a news article about the announcement, Mayor
Bloomberg said, “Obesity is a nationwide problem,
and all over the United States, public health officials
are wringing their hands saying, ‘Oh, this is terrible.’”
He added, “New York City is not about wringing your
hands; it’s about doing something.”9
A day later, “14 members of the City Council
wrote to the Mayor opposing the [proposed rule] and
insisting that, at the very least, it should be put before
the Council for a vote.”10 However, the proposed soda
container rule never was put before the City Council
for a vote.
Instead, DOHMH presented the proposed amendment to the Board of Health in June 2012 and a public
hearing on the soda container rule was held on July
24, 2012. According to the First Department: “Of more
than 38,000 written comments received prior to the
public hearing, approximately 32,000 (84 percent)
supported the proposal and approximately 6,000 (16
percent) opposed it. In addition, New Yorkers for
Beverage Choice submitted a petition opposing the
proposal, signed by more than 90,000 people.”11
The DOHMH made no changes to the initial proposal submitted to the public. Instead, the DOHMH
provided the Board with a memorandum summarizing and responding to the written comments. In the
memorandum, the DOHMH pointed out that “the
scientific evidence supporting associations between
sugary drinks, obesity, and other negative health consequences is compelling.”12
The DOHMH also noted that the proposed rule
would have a “material impact” on consumption of
sugary drinks because “patterns of human behavior
indicate that consumers gravitate toward the default
option.” Thus, the DOHMH concluded, “if the proposal is adopted, customers intent upon consuming
more than 16 ounces would have to make a conscious
decision to do so.”13 In response “to the critics’ assertion that the rule would result in economic hardship
for certain businesses, the agency responded that the
freedom to sell large sugary drinks ‘means little compared to the necessity to protect New Yorkers from the
obesity epidemic.’”14
On September 13, 2012, the Board of Health
voted to adopt the rule, and a “Notice of Adoption of
Amendment (§ 81.53) to Article 81 of the Health Code”
was published in the City Record. The rule was scheduled to go into effect on March 12, 2013.15

Litigation in the Supreme Court
Before the rule went into effect, it was challenged
by a number of groups who brought an action in
the Supreme Court of New York County seeking to
30

invalidate the soda container rule.16 The petitioners
claimed that the Board’s adoption of the Portion Cap
Rule usurped the role of the City Council and imposed
social policy by executive fiat, contending that the
Board “may not bypass the legislature, under the guise
of public health, and make fundamental policy choices
and establish far-reaching new policy programs all by
themselves, no matter how well-intentioned they may
be.”17
The Supreme Court declared the regulation invalid, primarily on the ground that the Board of Health
exceeded its authority and violated the separation of
powers doctrine set out in Boreali v. Axelrod.18 It also
found that the rule itself was arbitrary and capricious.19

The First Department’s Decision—Boreali as a
Controlling Case
The principal issue on appeal was whether the
Board of Health exceeded the bounds of its authority
as an administrative agency when it promulgated the
soda container rule. The First Department held that the
Board of Health exceeded the bounds of its lawfully
delegated authority as an administrative agency when
it promulgated the rule and therefore affirmed the
Supreme Court decision.20
The court first pointed out that the starting point
for analyzing whether the rule violates the separation
of powers doctrine is the New York State Court of Appeals’ landmark decision in Boreali v. Axelrod.21 Boreali
depended upon and articulated a type of delegation
doctrine. A state administrative agency not only is a
creature of the legislature, it also “may not, in the exercise of rulemaking authority, engage in broad-based
policy determinations.”22 The court acknowledged that
the line between permissible rulemaking authority
and impermissible policy determination is “difficult to
demarcate.”23
In Boreali, which involved regulations promulgated
by the Public Health Council (PHC), the Court relied
on four factors to determine whether an agency acted
beyond the bounds of its delegated authority and engaged in impermissible legislative policymaking:
First, the Court found that the PHC
had engaged in the balancing of
competing concerns of public health
and economic costs, “acting solely on
its own ideas of sound public policy.”
Second, the PHC did not engage in
the “interstitial” rule making typical of administrative agencies, but
had instead written “on a clean slate,
creating its own comprehensive set
of rules without benefit of legislative
guidance.” Third, the PHC’s regulations concerned “an area in which the
legislature had repeatedly tried—and
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failed—to reach an agreement in the
face of substantial public debate and
vigorous lobbying by a variety of
interested factions.” The separation of
powers principles mandate that elected legislators, rather than appointed
administrators “resolve difficult social
problems by making choices among
competing ends.” Fourth, the PHC
had overstepped its bounds because
the development of the regulations
did not require expertise in the field of
health.24
The First Department also relied on Matter of
Campagna v. Shaffer, in which the Court of Appeals
explained that “[a] key feature of the Boreali case…
was that the Legislature had never articulated a
policy regarding public smoking.”25 According to the
First Department, subsequent to Boreali, “courts have
consistently held that so long as an action taken by an
administrative agency is consistent with the policies
contemplated by the Legislature, the action taken will
survive constitutional scrutiny under the doctrine of
separation of powers.”26

The First Department’s Decision—Applying
Boreali
The First Department noted that the Board of
Health, although delegated a broad range of powers
that are essentially legislative in nature, has no inherent legislative power.27 Accordingly, the court stated,
the Board derives its power to establish rules and regulations directly and solely from the City Council. The
court then went on to assess the factors enunciated in
Boreali. In doing so, it found that all four Boreali factors
indicative of the usurpation of legitimate legislative
functions are present in this case.28 A brief summary of
the analysis of each factor follows.
The first Boreali factor is whether the agency has
balanced competing concerns of public health and
economic costs. In Boreali, the court found that the
PHC’s inclusion of exceptions and exemptions that
reflected the agency’s own balancing of economic
and social implications of the regulations was clear
evidence that the regulatory scheme was inconsistent
with the agency’s legislative authority.29 The PHC had
exempted certain establishments, such as bars and
certain restaurants, from the indoor smoking bans.
According to the court, this effort to “strike the proper
balance among health concerns, costs and privacy
interests…is a uniquely legislative function.”30 In
Boreali, the presence of exemptions was telling because
such exemptions did not reflect the agency’s charge to
protect public health but instead reflected the agency’s
own policy decisions with respect to the balance between protecting public health and ensuring economic
viability of certain industries.31
NYSBA Municipal Lawyer | Fall 2013 | Vol. 27 | No. 3

The First Department found that the first Boreali
factor was satisfied in this case. The DOHMH and
the Board members themselves indicated that they
weighed the potential benefits against economic factors during the public comment period and public
hearings.32 Just as in Boreali, the exemptions and exceptions to the soda container rule also evince a compromise of social and economic concerns as well as private
interests, the First Department held.33 The rule does
not apply to all FSEs, nor does it apply to all sugary
beverages.34
The court also found that the soda container rule
“looks beyond health concerns, in that it manipulates
choices to try to change consumer norms.”35 In essence, the rule was inherently a policy decision that
reflected a balance between health concerns, an individual consumer’s choice of diet, and business financial interests in providing the targeted sugary drinks.36
Such a policy decision is suited for legislative determinations, the court stated, because it involves “difficult
social problems” that must be resolved by “making
choices among competing ends.”37 In sum, the court
held that the first Boreali factor was met because the
selective restrictions enacted by the Board of Health
reveal that the health of New York City residents was
not its sole concern.38
The second Boreali factor—whether the Board of
Health exceeded its authority by writing on “a clean
slate” rather than using its regulatory power to fill in
the details of a legislative scheme—was also met in
the soda container case. Administrative agencies may
engage in what is known at “interstitial rule making,”
or the process of filling in the details of a broad legislative mandate and making that legislation operational.39
An agency exceeds the limits of its authority when the
agency’s action goes beyond filling in the details of a
broad legislative scheme.40
In Boreali, there was no legislation authorizing the
PHC to regulate smoking in public places. Thus, the
PHC “wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without the benefit of legislative
guidance.”41 Similarly, the First Department found that
in the soda container case the Board’s actions did not
constitute the type of interstitial rule making described
in Boreali. Here, the Board of Health did not fill in the
gaps of an already existing legislative scheme, but instead wrote on a clean slate. In the First Department’s
view, the Board’s actions were not the sort of interstitial rule making that typifies administrative regulatory
activity.42
The Board of Health insisted that it possessed
the authority to act, citing the City Charter’s grant of
broad authority to regulate “all matters affecting health
in the City.”43 The court held that although the Board’s
power is broad in scope, the City Charter did not authorize the Board’s actions.44 Such an exercise of power
31

would be an “unfettered delegation of legislative
power.”45 In addition, the First Department stated the
City Charter provides that the Board of Health may
exercise its power to modify the health code as long as
it is “not inconsistent with the constitution,” or with
the laws of the state and the City Charter.46 The court
held that the City Charter’s Enabling Act, granting the
Board of Health explicit power to establish, amend,
and repeal the Health Code, was clearly intended by
the legislature to provide the agency with the discretion to engage in interstitial rule making designed to
protect the public from health hazards.47 Thus, the
court found that because Board of Health did not designate soda consumption as a health hazard per se, the
Board of Health’s action in curtailing its consumption
was not the type of interstitial rule making intended
by the legislature.48
The third Boreali factor focused on the fact that
the legislature had repeatedly tried to pass legislation
implementing indoor smoking bans, yet had failed
to do so.49 In the Boreali court’s view, this reflected
the legislature’s inability to agree on the “goals and
methods that should govern in resolving” the issue.50
There, the agency’s attempt to impose a solution of its
own was improper. The court also distinguished the
case of failed legislative action from mere inaction,
holding that mere legislative inaction on a particular
issue should not satisfy this factor.51
With respect to the soda container rule, the First
Department noted that both the City and State legislatures have unsuccessfully attempted “to target
sugar-sweetened beverages.”52 The City Council
rejected several resolutions such as warning labels,
prohibiting food stamp use for purchase, and taxes on
such beverages.53 The State Assembly has introduced,
but not yet passed, bills prohibiting the sale of sugary
drinks on government property and prohibiting stores
with ten or more employees from displaying candy or
sugary drinks at the check-out counter or aisle.54 The
court found that although the rule employed different
means of targeting sugary beverages, it nevertheless
pursued the same end and thus addressed the same
policy area in which measures had been rejected by
both the State and City legislatures.55 According to the
Court this was a strong indication that the legislature
remains unsure of how best to approach the issue of
sugary beverage consumption.56 The First Department
concluded that the legislature’s inaction demonstrated
that the legislature had been unable to reach an agreement on the goals and methods that should govern in
resolving a society-wide health problem.57
The final Boreali factor in determining whether an
administrative agency has exceeded the bounds of its
legislative authority is whether any special expertise
or technical competence was involved in the development of the regulation. In Boreali, the PHC used its
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broad legislative grant of authority to develop a “simple code” that banned indoor smoking and exempted
certain groups.58 The Boreali court found that no technical competence or agency expertise was necessary to
develop this code.59 This indicated to the court that the
agency had engaged in unauthorized policy-making
rather than interstitial rulemaking.60
In the soda container case, the court found that the
Board of Health did not exercise any special expertise
or technical competence in developing the soda container rule.61 Rather, the rule was drafted and proposed
by the Office of the Mayor and submitted to the Board,
which enacted it without making any substantive
changes.62 This factor, although less compelling than
the others, also weighed in favor of invalidating the
rule, according to the First Department.63
After applying the four-factor test set forth in Boreali, the court concluded that the Board of Health had
overstepped the boundaries of its authority by violating the state principle of separation of powers. The
court did not address the argument that the regulation
was arbitrary and capricious.64

Framing the Dispute in the Appellate Division
The litigation over the soda container rule has
involved a number of disputes over how to frame the
controversy. As an initial matter, as noted earlier, the
petitioners referred to the rule in their brief before the
First Department as “the Ban”65—a term that suggests an authoritarian edict that deprives consumers
of certain beverages. It frames the dispute as a zerosum contest in which the Board of Health undeniably
denies consumers the opportunity to purchase soda.
The City, by contrast, defends what it calls “the Portion
Cap Rule”—a phrase that is meant to be neutral and
scientific and indicates an effort to clothe the rule in the
garb of scientific expertise. There is no explicit mention
of soda or sugar and no suggestion that consumers are
being deprived of choices. In determining whether the
Board has engaged in the broader task of policymaking or the more limited act of interstitial rulemaking, it
surely makes a difference in how the Board’s rule is defined and described. The Soda Ban suggests the former
while the Portion Cap Rule connotes the latter.
In their briefs before the First Department, the parties also engaged in a framing dispute over the extent
to which the case involved an abstract question of law
or a practical matter of policymaking. The petitioners
adopted a formalistic approach, insisting that there
should be no discussion of science or policy unless the
Board of Health, as a threshold matter, possesses the
authority to adopt the soda container rule. The preliminary statement of their brief begins: “This case is
not about obesity in New York City of soft drinks. It is
about whether the Mayor and his Board of Health can
usurp the authority of the City Council and decide for
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themselves what the law should be.”66 For the petitioners, the dispute was one that should be resolved
within the confines of black letter law.
The City, by contrast, sought to persuade the court
that obesity is a crisis that demands governmental
action. The preliminary statement of the City’s brief
states: “The Portion Cap Rule regulates how businesses serve a product whose overconsumption is driving
an epidemic.”67 Before addressing the legal issues
raised by the petitioners, the City devoted nearly two
pages of its preliminary statement to describing the extent of the obesity “health crisis” and the role of sugar
and soda in causing obesity; it then explained how
the soda container rule “is a measured response” to
that crisis.68 Confronted with such an alarming health
concern, the brief suggests, surely the Board of Health
has the authority to act—especially when its actions
are modest and supported by sufficient data.
The last framing dispute has been, thus far, the
most consequential. And that dispute is over the
authority invested in the Board of Health. Is the Board
wrongly claiming, as the petitioners insist, that it is
“unique among all State and City agencies” and therefore “not bound by constitutional limitations imposed
by the separation of powers”?69 Or is the City correct
in asserting that the Board is not “typical” and in fact
“is empowered to issue substantive rules and standards in public health matters,” with the authority to
protect “the health of New Yorkers from chronic and
preventable diseases and conditions”?70 Thus far, the
petitioners have persuaded the courts to accept their
view of the Board’s authority.
The First Department acknowledged that the New
York City Charter “explicitly grants” the Board of
Health “the power to supervise and regulate the safety
of the water and food supplies” in order to address
“inherently harmful matters,” but found that mere
“soda consumption” did not constitute such a “health
hazard.”71 Rather, the court stated, “the hazard arises
from the consumption of sugary soda in ‘excess quantity.’”72 Therefore, the First Department reasoned, the
Board’s “action in curtailing its consumption was not
the kind of interstitial rulemaking” permitted under
Boreali. This discussion accords with how the petitioners have framed the dispute.
However, if it is accepted that obesity is a crisis
that results, in large part, from the consumption of
sugary soda in excess quantities—that is, if excessive
soda consumption is found to be a “health hazard”—
and it is accepted that the soda container rule does not
ban the consumption of soda but only regulates how it
may be sold to consumers, then isn’t the soda container rule the sort of interstitial rulemaking allowed
under Boreali? The answer depends, it would seem, on
how the rule is framed by the parties and, ultimately,
by the Court of Appeals.
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